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INTRODUCTION 
For much of American history, Magna Carta has enjoyed almost 
as much popularity as the Constitution.1 Starting in the 1980s, socially 
conservative movements have increasingly made Magna Carta the 
centerpiece of their constitutional discourse.2 Pro-life activists weave 
Magna Carta into arguments for fetal personhood and the rights of 
clinic picketers.3 Religious conservatives make Magna Carta a focal 
point in the case against constitutional rights to marry and for 
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 1. On the influence of Magna Carta in the United States, see, for example, J.C. 
HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 45–46 (3d ed. 2015); Renée Lettow Lerner, The Troublesome 
Inheritance of Americans in Magna Carta and Trial by Jury, in MAGNA CARTA AND ITS 
MODERN LEGACY 77, 77–98 (Robert Hazell & James Melton eds., 2015); Jill Lepore, The 
Rule of History, NEW YORKER (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine
/2015/04/20/the-rule-of-history [perma.cc/3PRZ-RDQK]. 
 2. See infra Section I.A–B. 
 3. See infra Section I.A–B. 
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religious liberty as a valid basis for refusing service to gays and 
lesbians.4 
By studying the recent history of these arguments, this Article 
explores how and why Magna Carta has become a potent symbol of 
conservative constitutionalism. It argues that, for conservative 
movements, Magna Carta works as part of a form of ultra-
originalism—an argument for the importance of history and tradition 
in constraining judicial discretion.5 Moreover, conservatives use 
Magna Carta as an alternative to a progressive vision centered on the 
Reconstruction Amendments to the Constitution. In particular, social 
conservatives rely on Magna Carta to shift debate away from the 
liberty and equality guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. As 
symbolized by Magna Carta, conservatives argue that American 
constitutional tradition rests not on expanding liberty but on resisting 
the tyranny of the government and the courts. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I canvasses the rise and 
spread of arguments based on Magna Carta within conservative 
movements. Part II analyzes the purpose of Magna Carta as a symbol 
for activists opposing legal abortion or gay rights, and a brief 
conclusion follows.  
I.  AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS 
Magna Carta’s actual history is far more complicated than the 
account of resistance to tyranny championed by movement 
conservatives. After losing many of his territories in France in the 
early thirteenth century, King John drained many of his kingdom’s 
resources to try to restore what he had lost.6 In January 1215, a group 
of barons, angry at what they viewed as John’s abuse of power, 
formed a sworn association to demand satisfaction of their grievances 
and called for a return to the rights expressed in the charter of Henry 
 
 4. See infra Section I.C.  
 5. For further description of originalism, see, for example, Nelson Lund, The Second 
Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1372 (2009) 
(“The core of originalism	is the proposition that text and history impose meaningful, 
binding constraints on interpretive discretion	.	.	.	.”); Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All 
Originalists Now, in CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 1, 4 (Robert W. 
Bennett & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2011) (arguing that the fixation thesis—which holds 
that the textual meaning of the Constitution was fixed at the time of ratification—and the 
textual constraint thesis—which argues that the original meaning of the text has legal 
force—“are accepted by almost every originalist thinker”). 
 6. See ANTHONY ARLIDGE & IGOR JUDGE, MAGNA CARTA UNCOVERED, at xii 
(2014); James Melton & Robert Hazell, Magna Carta	.	.	.	Holy Grail?, in MAGNA CARTA 
AND ITS MODERN LEGACY, supra note 1, at 3, 5–6. 
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I.7 The conflict between the king and the barons threatened to turn 
into a civil war, and so to defuse tensions, King John agreed to limit 
taxes and other feudal payments to the crown, curb illegal 
imprisonment, and expand access to swift judgment.8 These 
agreements formed the basis of what we know today as Magna Carta. 
While the agreement between John and the barons quickly 
collapsed, Magna Carta as a symbol endured.9 In 1628, Sir Edward 
Coke, one of the most prominent jurists of his era, penned an 
influential account of the document’s origins and reach.10 Coke 
argued that the barons who resented John’s tyranny successfully 
demanded the restoration of precious common law rights.11 In recent 
years, revisionist historians have questioned Coke’s analysis, claiming 
that John was at least partly the victim of circumstances created by 
the father and brother who ruled before him.12 Nevertheless, Coke’s 
account has had tremendous staying power, making Magna Carta a 
symbol of the hope that “a simple piece of parchment delineating the 
legal limits of executive power can tame even the most oppressive 
tyrants.”13 
This Part chronicles the rise of Magna Carta as a tool in 
movement conservative constitutionalism. Section I.A explores the 
constitutional strategies of right-leaning social movements in the 
1970s, using the pro-life movement as a case study of how some 
conservative organizations originally turned to the Fourteenth 
Amendment in framing their demands. Section I.B traces the reasons 
pro-life activists have, to some extent, turned away from this tactic 
and adopted Magna Carta as an alternative symbol of the cause. 
Studying struggles over campaign finance, same-sex marriage, and 
 
 7. See ARLIDGE & JUDGE, supra note 6, at xii. 
 8. See id.; Vernon Bogdanor, Magna Carta, the Rule of Law and the Reform of the 
Constitution, in MAGNA CARTA AND ITS MODERN LEGACY, supra note 1, at 23, 23–24. 
 9. Melton & Hazell, supra note 6, at 3. 
 10. For analysis of Coke’s account, see Lettow Lerner, supra note 1, at 79–80; John 
Witte, Jr., Towards a New Magna Carta for Early Modern England, in MAGNA CARTA, 
RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW 109, 113 (Robin Griffith-Jones & Mark Hill eds., 
2015). 
 11. See Melton & Hazell, supra note 6, at 4. For more on Coke’s influence on the 
understanding and veneration of the charter, see, for example, HOLT, supra note 1, at 34 
(arguing that lawyers “[l]ed by Sir Edward Coke” “have been responsible for much of [its] 
survival and for the residual veneration of the Charter”); PETER LINEBAUGH, THE 
MAGNA CARTA MANIFESTO: LIBERTIES AND COMMONS FOR ALL 78 (2008) (explaining 
that Coke helped to transform Magna Carta from a “medieval document rarely 
cited	.	.	.	into a modern constitutional law”).  
 12. For examples of these histories, see generally HOLT, supra note 1. See also RALPH 
V. TURNER, MAGNA CARTA THROUGH THE AGES 34 (2003). 
 13. Melton & Hazell, supra note 6, at 4. 
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conscience-based objections, Section I.C examines the spread of 
conservative uses of Magna Carta in subsequent decades. 
A. Roe v. Wade and Magna Carta’s Broad Pre-1980s Appeal 
Magna Carta did not originally serve as a symbol for the 
constitutional ambitions of socially conservative movements. For 
much of the twentieth century, Magna Carta undeniably had a broad 
appeal,14 even if the precise influence of the charter remains hard to 
measure.15 Several American colonies borrowed from the text of the 
charter in writing their state constitutions, and language related to 
Magna Carta remains in these states’ constitutions to this day.16 The 
charter’s indirect influence is much greater.17 The drafters of the Bill 
of Rights drew on English common law and statutes rooted in Magna 
Carta.18 Often, American leaders explicitly invoked Magna Carta as a 
source of constitutional meaning, even when they did not refer to the 
charter’s text.19 
If Magna Carta took on any partisan resonance, it was far from 
obvious that the charter would later become largely associated with 
the American right. For much of the 1960s and 1970s, the charter 
instead appeared in amicus briefs justifying new procedural 
protections for criminal defendants.20 The American Civil Liberties 
Union (“ACLU”) frequently used Magna Carta to illuminate the 
dangers of overzealous criminal prosecution and to justify protections 
for those accused of committing a crime.21 In 1965, for example, the 
 
 14. See Lepore, supra note 1; Sarah Lyall, Magna Carta, Still Posing a Challenge at 800, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/15/world/europe/magna-carta-
still-posing-a-challenge-at-800.html?_r=0	[http://perma.cc/LLM7-FBKT (dark archive)] 
(explaining that in the United States, Magna Carta “is treated with a reverence bordering on 
worship”). 
 15. Cf. Melton & Hazell, supra note 6, at 14 (explaining that Magna Carta’s influence 
was mostly symbolic).  
 16. See id. at 9–10. 
 17. See id. at 10. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See id. at 13. For example, at the time of the founding, both Federalists and Anti-
Federalists invoked Magna Carta in support of their positions without specifically 
mentioning the text of the charter. See id. at 13–14. More recently, President Barack 
Obama focused on Magna Carta in inaugurating “Law Day,” a holiday dedicated to the 
rule of law. See Proclamation No. 9265, 80 Fed. Reg. 25,579 (Apr. 30, 2015).  
 20. For examples of the ACLU’s use of Magna Carta in the period, see Brief for 
ACLU, Amicus Curiae at 2, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (No. 110); Brief of the 
Florida Civil Liberties Union & the ACLU, Amici Curiae at 7, Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 
57 (1961) (No. 31); Brief of the Northern California Branch of the ACLU as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Appellant at 14, Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) (No. 70). 
 21. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
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organization referred to Magna Carta in challenging the 
constitutionality of using the death penalty in cases of statutory 
rape.22 Later, in Klopfer v. North Carolina,23 a 1967 case, the ACLU 
pointed to Magna Carta in defending Professor Peter Klopfer after he 
was arrested for participating in a sit-in in Chapel Hill, North 
Carolina.24 Klopfer joined others in protesting the segregation of 
public accommodations in the state, and as a result, authorities 
charged him with criminal trespass.25 After the jury failed to reach a 
verdict in Klopfer’s first trial, prosecutors informed him that they 
were suspending the proceedings against him but reserved the right to 
bring him to court again at any time.26 Before the Supreme Court, the 
ACLU argued that the State of North Carolina’s decision violated the 
right to a speedy trial “first given effect in the Magna Carta” and 
“cherished by . . . [the] American patriots and lawyers” who drafted 
the Constitution.27 
The NAACP drew on Magna Carta in similar ways. For 
example, in Boykin v. Alabama,28 the organization challenged the 
death sentence imposed on Earl Boykin after he pleaded guilty to five 
counts of robbery.29 State law allowed juries almost unfettered 
discretion in deciding on a proper punishment, and in Boykin’s case, 
the jury opted for the death penalty.30 The NAACP argued, among 
other things, that the statute under which Boykin was sentenced 
 
 22. Brief of ACLU & Texas Civil Liberties Union, as Amici Curiae at 8, Johnston v. 
Texas, 384 U.S. 1024 (1966) (No. 1370). The Court ultimately declined certiorari in 
Johnston. See Johnston, 384 U.S. at 1024. 
 23. 386 U.S. 213 (1967). 
 24. See Motion of the ACLU & the ACLU of North Carolina for Leave to File a 
Brief as Amici Curiae & Brief Amici Curiae at 4, 12, Klopfer, 386 U.S. 213 (No. 100). 
 25. See Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 217. The Klopfer Court ultimately held that North 
Carolina’s decision violated the right to a speedy trial. See id. at 213. 
 26. Id. at 213. 
 27. Motion of the ACLU & the ACLU of North Carolina for Leave to File a Brief as 
Amici Curiae & Brief Amici Curiae, supra note 24, at 12. The ACLU referenced Chapter 
40 of Magna Carta in support of its position. See id. (“The right to a speedy trial is of long 
standing. Its basic nature is disclosed by its deep roots in the early common law. It was	first 
given	effect	in the	Magna	Carta	where it was written ‘To no one will we sell, to no one 
deny or delay, right or justice.’	” (quoting MAGNA CARTA ch. 40 (1215), reprinted and 
translated in DAVID CARPENTER, MAGNA CARTA 52–53 (Penguin Classics 2015))). 
 28. 395 U.S. 238 (1968). 
 29. See id. at 240; Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. & 
the National Office for the Rights of the Indigent, as Amici Curiae at 63, Boykin, 395 U.S. 
238 (No. 642). 
 30. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 240. For the text of the statute, see ALA. CODE §	15-15-24 
(1975). 
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violated the Due Process Clause.31 Magna Carta figured centrally in 
this argument. The NAACP explained: “For, whatever else ‘due 
process of law’ may encompass, . . . [it requires] some adherence to 
the principle established by Magna Carta that the life and liberty of 
the subject should not be taken but by the law of the land.”32 At a 
time when the Warren Court dramatically expanded the procedural 
protections available to criminal defendants,33 the ACLU and 
NAACP insisted that the rights afforded defendants were anything 
but novel. 
Progressive social movements made Magna Carta a valuable part 
of their rhetorical arsenal. It was not obvious then that burgeoning 
conservative groups would later downplay arguments for expanding 
liberty or equality under the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, in the 
1970s, the pro-life movement—one of the pioneers of later arguments 
centered on Magna Carta—based its constitutional strategy on the 
Fourteenth Amendment.34 After the Supreme Court decided Roe v. 
Wade,35 Robert Destro, a prominent pro-life law professor, 
condemned the justices for “reject[ing] the egalitarian philosophy 
embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the [F]ourteenth 
[A]mendment.”36 
Pro-lifers argued first that the Due Process Clause recognized an 
implied right to life. In the mid-1970s, Americans United for Life, a 
leading pro-life public-interest litigation organization, argued that the 
right to life counted among the “natural rights” recognized in the 
Declaration of Independence and incorporated implicitly into the 
Constitution.37 The United States Catholic Conference similarly 
reasoned in 1976: “The granting of legal 
personhood . . . is . . . properly the product of a constitutional analysis 
 
 31. See Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. & the National 
Office for the Rights of the Indigent, as Amici Curiae, supra note 29, at 63. 
 32. Id. The Court in Boykin ultimately reversed the defendant’s conviction on other 
grounds, holding that the trial court erred by failing to ensure that Boykin’s guilty plea was 
knowing and voluntary. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244. 
 33. See, e.g., Norman Dorsen, John Marshall Harlan and the Warren Court, in THE 
WARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 109, 111 (Mark Tushnet 
ed., 1993) (analyzing the transformation of criminal procedure during the Warren Court, 
particularly in the context of Justice Harlan’s dissents); Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court 
and Criminal Justice, in THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE 116, 116–17 (Bernard 
Schwartz ed., 1996) (analyzing the Warren Court’s criminal procedure “revolution”).  
 34. See MARY ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION 
DEBATE 40–45 (2015). 
 35. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 36. Robert A. Destro, Abortion and the Constitution: The Need for a Life-Protective 
Amendment, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1250, 1327 (1975). 
 37. See ZIEGLER, supra note 34, at 39. 
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which recognizes the existence of rights which must be said to be 
implicit . . . .”38 
Pro-life activists also used the Equal Protection Clause in service 
of their cause. Attorneys like Robert Byrn compared fetuses to 
discrete and insular minorities, explaining that unborn children were 
defenseless, subject to discrimination (in the form of abortion), and 
defined by a trait (residence in the womb) that they were powerless to 
change.39 Activists recognized that the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses applied only to legal persons, and movement leaders 
used the Equal Protection Clause as a vehicle for proving that “the 
unborn child is a human being, and it is difficult to conceive of a 
human being who is not a person.”40 
The movement’s major post-Roe initiative, the push for a fetal-
protective constitutional amendment, centered on the claim that the 
progressive Reconstruction Amendments protected an unborn child’s 
right to life.41 For example, in testifying in favor of an amendment 
that would have banned abortion, Joseph Witherspoon, a law 
professor and board member of the nation’s largest pro-life group, 
focused on the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.42 
Witherspoon testified that far from merely abolishing slavery, those 
amendments “sought to protect every human being, including unborn 
children,	.	.	.	in the enjoyment of the fundamental human rights to life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”43 
Non-lawyers frequently compared the Roe decision to Dred Scott 
v. Sandford,44 the now-notorious ruling holding that African 
Americans could not be citizens.45 However, for pro-lifers in the 
1970s, a comparison to Dred Scott served not to condemn the 
overreaching of the courts but to connect the antiabortion cause to 
 
 38. Brief of Amicus Curiae for United States Catholic Conference at 16, Planned 
Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (Nos. 74-1151, 74-1419). 
 39. See Mary Ziegler, Originalism Talk: A Legal History, 2014 BYU L. REV. 869, 888–
89 (2014). For examples of this argument, see Robert M. Byrn, Abortion in Perspective, 5 
DUQ. L. REV. 125, 134–35 (1966); Robert M. Byrn, Abortion-on-Demand: Whose 
Morality, 46 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 5, 26–27 (1970). 
 40. Byrn, Abortion in Perspective, supra note 39, at 134. For more on the strategy of 
using the Equal Protection Clause as a vehicle for personhood arguments, see Ziegler, 
supra note 39, at 886–90. 
 41. See ZIEGLER, supra note 34, at 38–44. 
 42. Proposed Constitutional Amendments on Abortion: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 
26 (1976) (statement of Joseph P. Witherspoon, Thomas Shelton Maxey Professor of Law, 
University of Texas School of Law). 
 43. Id. 
 44. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
 45. See ZIEGLER, supra note 34, at 41, 45. 
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the fight for abolition and racial equality.46 Dr. John Willke, a leading 
abortion opponent, explained in Congress: “[At the time of Dred 
Scott] discrimination was on the basis of skin color; today it is on the 
basis of place of residence—living in the womb.”47 
In the 1970s, pro-lifers’ reliance on the Reconstruction 
Amendments made legal and political sense. For almost a decade 
after Roe, neither political party had taken a clear stand on abortion.48 
Pro-lifers tried to identify allies on the right and left.49 By 1980, 
however, the Republican Party platform included an endorsement of 
a fetal-protective constitutional amendment and called for the 
appointment of federal judges who opposed abortion.50 By contrast, 
the Democratic Party platform treated the right to privacy as 
synonymous with reproductive liberty.51 The religious right offered 
abortion opponents the most logical source of political influence and 
financial support.52 
As pro-lifers came to view the Democratic Party as a political 
threat, it became incongruous for them to rely on an expansive 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. To be sure, the 
 
 46. See id. at 45. 
 47. Proposed Constitutional Amendments on Abortion: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 
42, at 408 (testimony of Dr. John C. Willke and Barbara Willke, Cincinnati, Ohio, Right to 
Life Society). 
 48. For discussion of prominent pro-life politicians from both main political parties in 
the late 1960s and 1970s, see DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT 
TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 311–13 (1994); CAROL J. C. MAXWELL, 
PRO-LIFE ACTIVISTS IN AMERICA: MEANING, MOTIVATION, AND DIRECT ACTION 35–
37 (2002); RICKIE SOLINGER, BEGGARS AND CHOOSERS: HOW THE POLITICS OF CHOICE 
SHAPES ADOPTION, ABORTION, AND WELFARE IN THE UNITED STATES 12–13 (2001); 
William V. D’Antonio, Steven A. Tuch & John Kenneth White, Catholicism, Abortion, 
and the Emergence of the “Culture Wars” in the U.S. Congress, 1971–2006, in CATHOLICS 
AND POLITICS: THE DYNAMIC TENSION BETWEEN FAITH & POWER 129, 130–47 (Kristen 
E. Heyer, Mark J. Rozell & Michael A. Genovese eds., 2008). On the parties’ refusal to 
take a strong stand on abortion in the period, see ZIEGLER, supra note 34, at 72–75, 203–
06.  
 49. See ZIEGLER, supra note 34, at 175–78. 
 50. Republican Party Platform of 1980, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www
.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25844 [perma.cc/5AG9-TC35]. For commentary on the 
Republican platform, see Adam Clymer, The Conservatives’ Message: GOP Platform 
Waves a “Banner of Bold Colors,” Perhaps Too Bold for Reagan’s Comfort This Fall, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 16, 1980, at A1; Robert S. Strauss, The Platform: Just What Reagan Wanted 
and So Richly Deserved, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1980, at E21. 
 51. Democratic Party Platform of 1980, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www
.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29607 [http://perma.cc.UMVB-Z2U7 (staff-uploaded archive)]. 
For commentary on the Democratic platform, see David E. Rosenbaum, Platform Drafters 
Back Carter Stands, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1980, at A1. 
 52. See ZIEGLER, supra note 34, at 201–05. 
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movement’s previous strategy had not paid off, but the timing and 
nature of the movement’s shift in strategy illustrate the significance of 
political pressure during this period. The Court’s rejection of the 
movement’s Fourteenth Amendment arguments in Roe and other 
cases of the 1970s did nothing to immediately dissuade movement 
members from relying on the Fourteenth Amendment.53 When the 
time came to look for fresh strategies, there was nothing inevitable 
about the movement’s rejection of broad interpretations of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, within movement circles, related 
interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment recognizing an implied 
right to life and fetal personhood persist to this day.54 
The politics of the 1980s made it costly for pro-lifers to 
emphasize these arguments. Under President Ronald Reagan, the 
Republican Party denounced the federal courts’ broad interpretation 
of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses as a key example of 
judicial activism.55 In 1981, for instance, William French Smith, the 
attorney general during Reagan’s first term, pointed to the Court’s 
Fourteenth Amendment decisions as evidence of unbridled judicial 
activism.56 Soon, leading pro-life activists like Dr. John Willke of the 
National Right to Life Committee condemned Roe’s interpretation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment not for ignoring the unborn but for being 
“the most extreme example[] of ‘judicial activism’ . . .	in this 
century.”57 While movement conservatives would still point to the 
Fourteenth Amendment in support of their arguments, activists 
criticized the Court’s interpretation of the amendment and asserted 
that Magna Carta illuminated a more principled reading of the 
constitutional text. 
B. The Pro-Life Movement Turns to Magna Carta as an Alternative 
As abortion opponents downplayed arguments based on the 
Fourteenth Amendment, some movement members began searching 
for an alternative symbol of the movement’s cause. In 1989, James 
Joseph Lynch, Jr., an attorney affiliated with a variety of California-
 
 53. See id. at 34–38 (describing examples of this strategy, which was emphasized for 
the better part of a decade after Roe). 
 54. See Ziegler, supra note 39, at 921. 
 55. See ZIEGLER, supra note 34, at 54–56; Fred Barbash & Mary Thornton, Smith 
Outlines Strategy to Curb Court Activism, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 1981), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1981/11/30/smith-outlines-strategy-to-curb-court-
activism/30fc6972-8ff1-44a9-a320-bb6d4cb20cee/ [perma.cc/X7R5-S2TK]. 
 56. See Barbash & Thornton, supra note 55. 
 57. Nomination of Sandra Day O’Connor: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 97th Cong. 334 (1981) (testimony of John C. Willke, M.D.). 
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based antiabortion groups, first looked to Magna Carta as a 
supplement to existing arguments about the right to life.58 Lynch 
submitted briefs in a pair of cases, Ohio v. Akron Reproductive Health 
Services59 and Hodgson v. Minnesota,60 in which Magna Carta figured 
centrally.61 Lynch insisted that Magna Carta served as guidance about 
the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.62 “The concept 
to protect a person from due process in American Jurisprudence is 
derived from the Magna Carta,” Lynch explained.63 “The 5th 
Amendment prohibits the taking of life without due process of law, 
and it is enforced and made binding against the states by the 14th 
Amendment.”64 Because Magna Carta broadly defined and protected 
persons, as Lynch reasoned, the Fourteenth Amendment allowed 
abortion restrictions designed to safeguard fetal life.65 In Lynch’s 
view, Magna Carta revealed the meaning of personhood recognized 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Arguments involving Magna Carta became more visible after the 
intensification of anti-clinic violence in the late 1980s.66 As long as 
freestanding abortion clinics were in operation, anti-abortion 
picketers flocked to them to protest outside.67 However, in the late 
1980s, Randall Terry, a veteran of anti-clinic pickets, called for a 
more organized, explicitly Christian brand of direct action protest—
 
 58. See Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief and Brief of James Joseph 
Lynch, Jr. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant at 21, Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for 
Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (No. 88-805) [hereinafter Brief of James Joseph 
Lynch, Akron II]; Brief of James Joseph Lynch, Jr. as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 22, Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (No. 88-1125) [hereinafter 
Brief of James Joseph Lynch, Hodgson]. 
 59. 497 U.S. 502 (1990). 
 60. 497 U.S. 417 (1990). 
 61. See supra note 58. 
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one that would block access to clinics entirely.68 Arguing that the 
“higher law” trumped the laws of man, Terry explicitly invited 
protestors to break local laws on trespassing.69 Terry’s organization, 
Operation Rescue, would launch major blockades designed to close 
abortion clinics in major urban centers.70 The organization became 
known for mass arrests of protestors, explicitly evangelical Protestant 
rhetoric, and claims that protestors could justifiably break trespassing 
laws to reject what they saw as a tyrannical Roe decision.71 
Inside and outside of court, self-proclaimed rescuers put Magna 
Carta to new rhetorical use. One prominent example surfaced when 
the National Organization for Women (“NOW”) sued a group of 
antiabortion protestors called the Pro-Life Action Network 
(“PLAN”) under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (“RICO”).72 In NOW v. Scheidler,73 NOW alleged 
that PLAN and later Operation Rescue had organized a nationwide 
conspiracy to block access to abortion clinics by threatening or using 
violence.74 
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From the beginning, rescuers insisted that they had committed 
no criminal act in exercising their right to free speech.75 At first, these 
arguments seemed to make little headway. In 1994, the Court held 
unanimously that RICO liability did not require an economic 
motive.76 After a seven-week trial on remand, a jury found that the 
defendants had violated the civil provisions of RICO,77 and the 
blockaders unsuccessfully appealed to the Seventh Circuit.78 In 
seeking review at the Supreme Court, Catholics for Life, a direct-
action group, described Magna Carta as a source of meaning for the 
U.S. Constitution.79 To pro-life protestors, Magna Carta stood for the 
basic guarantees available in any civilized society. Rescuers argued 
that the charter shed light not only on the original meaning of the 
Constitution, but also on the basic purpose of constitutional order.80 
Rather than carving out evolving forms of equality or liberty, the 
Constitution, like Magna Carta, should stand between individual 
dissenters and “sheer brutal power.”81 
Ultimately, the effort to hold blockaders liable under RICO fell 
short.82 However, as the Scheidler litigation suggested, using Magna 
Carta as a rhetorical tool appealed to a variety of right-wing groups 
questioning the legitimacy of the federal government. Magna Carta 
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was not solely invoked to shield conservative abortion protestors 
from liability; other groups with conservative aims also found reason 
to weave the charter into their arguments. Antigovernment groups 
that refused to pay taxes or recognize the authority of the federal 
government similarly cited Magna Carta as one of the few sources of 
legitimate law.83 
After 2000, more mainstream conservative groups used Magna 
Carta as a powerful weapon in the courts. New arguments involving 
Magna Carta served three purposes. First, movement conservatives 
used the charter to identify a constitutional baseline—the most basic 
protections any citizen could expect. Second, Magna Carta helped to 
lend a kind of super-legitimacy to the rights (or definitions of rights) 
conservative attorneys described. Insofar as all rights emerged from 
history and tradition, liberties mentioned in Magna Carta enjoyed a 
unique pedigree. Finally, Magna Carta represented an alternative to 
the Reconstruction Amendments. If liberals identified the 
government as a protector of the liberty of the weak, conservative 
activists used Magna Carta to frame the government as the greatest 
threat to American freedom. 
C. The Conservative Magna Carta in Struggles Over Campaign 
Finance and Marriage 
The rescuers represented in Scheidler stood at the fringes of the 
pro-life movement. By the late 2000s, however, mainstream pro-life 
leaders joined other social conservatives in highlighting Magna Carta. 
At first, arguments involving Magna Carta appeared in the fight to 
repeal campaign finance regulations.84 In 2007, the American Center 
for Law and Justice (“ACLJ”) and Focus on the Family, socially 
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conservative groups, incorporated a lengthy discussion of Magna 
Carta into their amicus curiae brief in Federal Election Commission v. 
Wisconsin Right to Life.85 That case involved a challenge to the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, a law preventing the use of 
corporate funds for certain political advertisements sixty days before 
an election.86 The ACLJ and Focus on the Family pointed to Magna 
Carta as a guide to the meaning of the First Amendment and its right 
to petition for redress of grievances.87 For example, in challenging a 
law that created a blackout period in which advertising was 
prohibited prior to primaries and general elections, both groups 
argued that Magna Carta was the source of a right to petition for 
redress of grievances that entitled grassroots groups to air issue 
advertisements.88 
As the campaign finance battle wore on, and as conservative 
lawmakers developed more aggressive conscience-based exemptions 
to laws on abortion, contraception, and sexual orientation 
discrimination, movement conservatives transformed Magna Carta 
into a symbol of freedom of religion as well as speech. These 
arguments recently attracted attention during the litigation of Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores.89 Hobby Lobby involved a challenge under 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) to the 
contraceptive mandate of the Affordable Care Act.90 Congress 
originally passed RFRA to reinstate the interpretation of the Free 
Exercise Clause adopted by the Court prior to its decision in 
Employment Division v. Smith.91 Prior to Smith, the Court 
identified—albeit sparingly—violations of the Free Exercise Clause 
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when a law substantially burdened a believer’s practice of religion.92 
In Smith, by contrast, the Court concluded that any neutral law of 
general applicability would not violate the Free Exercise Clause, even 
if it significantly burdened religious exercise.93 RFRA reinstated the 
substantial-burden standard, and conservative amici in Hobby Lobby 
used Magna Carta in reasoning about the meaning of religious liberty 
under the statute and the Constitution.94 
In an amicus brief in Hobby Lobby, a coalition of conservative 
groups used Magna Carta to highlight the importance of religious 
liberty, even for corporations.95 “The Puritan Revolution was 
conceived to be a restoration of the ancient liberties of Englishmen as 
laid down in Magna Carta[,]” the brief explained.96 “The most 
interesting aspect is that they used a secular legal structure, the 
business company, to serve their religious freedom.”97 For these 
activists, Magna Carta symbolized not only resistance to federal 
tyranny and the importance of tradition and history, but also the 
importance of religious freedom to those demanding liberty from the 
state.98 
As the struggle for marriage equality intensified in the late 2000s, 
social conservative groups like the ACLJ developed more elaborate 
uses for Magna Carta. As William Eskridge has shown, opponents of 
gay rights have changed their argumentative agenda considerably 
over time.99 After discounting biblical arguments against 
homosexuality, anti-gay activists emphasized the supposed threat that 
gay men posed to children.100 In the 1990s, in describing sexuality as a 
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behavioral preference rather than an immutable orientation, anti-gay 
groups described marriage protections as unnecessary forms of 
“special rights.”101 Over time, however, as more courts interpreted 
state constitutions to guarantee same-sex couples’ right to marry,102 
anti-gay groups sought out new arguments. As it became harder and 
harder to identify an adequate state interest supporting marriage 
restrictions, activists and supportive scholars focused on the lack of 
support for same-sex marriage in the nation’s history and tradition.103 
Magna Carta has frequently appeared in these recent arguments 
against same-sex marriage. In Hollingsworth v. Perry,104 the first 
attempt to get the Supreme Court to issue a ruling on marriage 
equality, an opposing group of scholars argued that Magna Carta 
helped to show that the “Nation lacks anything resembling a deeply 
rooted history, legal tradition, or practice of gay marriage.”105 
A year later, in Obergefell v. Hodges,106 a variety of groups 
incorporated Magna Carta into warnings about the dangers of judicial 
overreaching. Historians and scholars defending existing bans 
emphasized that Magna Carta’s use of gendered terms to describe 
marriage had shaped the American Constitution.107 The Conservative 
Legal Defense and Education Fund, joined by other groups, 
contrasted the traditional role of marriage in society, which it argued 
was based on due process rights dating back to Magna Carta, with one 
based on a form of “social science	.	.	.	[that would] pervert[] the rule 
of law, and seduce[] judges to function as oracles.”108 The 
International Conference of Evangelical Endorsers also used Magna 
Carta as the source of a “unique American perspective based on a 
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Christian view.”109 By ignoring so deeply rooted a tradition, the courts 
would be acting just as tyrannically as King John.110 A judge-
transformed Constitution would “no longer represent[] a government 
of the people, by the people or for the people, but whatever nine 
unelected justices agree it is,” argued the International Conference.111 
“This is not a value worthy of one’s life, given our past cost defending 
against arbitrary tyranny, whether it be king, prince or tyrant.”112 
After Obergefell, conservative movements continue to use 
Magna Carta as a symbol of individual, often religious resistance to 
governmental tyranny. Robert Knight, the former leader of the 
Family Research Council and a senior fellow at the conservative 
American Civil Rights Union, responded to Obergefell by reasoning 
that Magna Carta would be relevant as long as “the left’s ongoing 
hostility to religious freedom and its pursuit of a radically secular 
agenda keeps bumping up against principled opposition.”113 In 
asserting that “religious liberty [was] under attack,” the United States 
Conference of Catholic Bishops cited Magna Carta in justifying 
resistance to the contraceptive mandate of the Affordable Care Act 
and adoption by same-sex couples.114 Quin Hillyer, a conservative 
commentator, pointed to Magna Carta in arguing that “the battle to 
protect religious liberty will be a . . . rallying cry for Republican 
primary/caucus voters in 2016.”115 
These arguments have resonated with some on the Court. Justice 
Thomas’s dissenting opinion in Obergefell relied heavily on Magna 
Carta—a document he presented as a definitive guide in 
understanding the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.116 Concurring in McDonald v. City of Chicago,117 a 
Second Amendment case, Justice Thomas also traced the liberties 
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covered by the Privileges and Immunities Clause back to Magna 
Carta.118 
Recently, Justice Scalia similarly relied on the charter in 
outlining a narrow view of the Due Process Clause.119 In Kerry v. 
Din,120 Fauzia Din, a United States citizen, argued that the 
government’s refusal to grant a visa to her husband without adequate 
explanation violated the Fifth Amendment’s due process guarantee.121 
After Din’s husband, an Afghan citizen and former Taliban official, 
applied for a visa at a Pakistani consulate, an official rejected the 
application, citing a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
barring aliens involved in “terrorist activities” but offering no further 
explanation.122 Din brought suit, arguing that she had a protected 
liberty interest in marriage that entitled her to a more meaningful 
review of her husband’s visa application.123 Dissenting from Scalia’s 
plurality opinion, the Court’s liberal members sided with Din, arguing 
that Magna Carta supported her demand for “notice of an adverse 
action, an opportunity to present relevant proofs and 
arguments . . . before a neutral decisionmaker, and reasoned 
decisionmaking.”124 
In a sweeping plurality opinion, Scalia relied on the charter in 
concluding that Din had neither a protectable interest nor a 
legitimate complaint about the process surrounding her husband’s 
visa denial.125 Scalia reached this conclusion by echoing social 
conservatives’ understanding of Magna Carta as an authoritative 
guide to the limited rights protected by the Constitution. Stressing 
that “[t]he Due Process Clause has its origin in Magna Carta,” Scalia 
suggested that the Due Process Clause protected nothing more than 
the liberties encompassed by the charter.126 Scalia’s plurality opinion 
rejecting Din’s claim made apparent that the charter can serve as a 
limiting principle for the Court’s more conservative members, an 
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alternative to what Scalia called “the textually unsupportable doctrine 
of implied fundamental rights.”127 
Why have conservatives so often used Magna Carta in framing 
their demands? On some level, it should come as no surprise that the 
charter speaks to conservative constitutionalists. After all, for much 
of the nation’s history, judges and politicians with deeply different 
views have presented Magna Carta as an indispensable part of the 
nation’s constitutional tradition. Nevertheless, conservatives’ use of 
Magna Carta has changed significantly over time. Part II next 
considers why many conservative movements have gravitated so 
strongly to Magna Carta in recent years. 
II.  THE USES OF THE CONSERVATIVE MAGNA CARTA 
There is nothing inevitable or even natural about conservative 
movements’ turn to Magna Carta. Indeed, Magna Carta has 
consistently formed part of civil libertarians’ arguments for 
procedural protections for criminal defendants.128 Justice Kennedy 
prominently mentioned Magna Carta in Boumediene v. Bush129 in 
striking down the Military Commissions Act of 2006 and holding that 
prisoners at Guantanamo Bay had habeas corpus rights.130 In this 
more familiar sense, Magna Carta stands for the importance of 
guaranteeing due process, even for the most unpopular outsider 
groups. 
Magna Carta has proven surprisingly prominent in movement 
conservative arguments about the meaning of the Constitution. 
Section A explores the reasons that conservative activists and 
attorneys have used the charter in advancing their agenda. Section B 
evaluates the efficacy and accuracy of arguments involving Magna 
Carta that have figured centrally in conservative constitutionalism. 
A. Why Conservatives Turn to Magna Carta 
Why have conservative movements derived so much value from 
Magna Carta, and how do the new uses developed by right-wing 
movements differ from the ones used to expand procedural 
protections for criminal defendants? First, Magna Carta has figured 
centrally in activists’ and attorneys’ creation of a kind of ultra-
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originalism.131 In an interpretive sense, conservative movements urge 
the courts to look to Magna Carta to understand open-textured or 
vague terms like “privileges and immunities” or “freedom of 
speech.”132 Blockaders have used Magna Carta in this way in arguing 
that, at a minimum, the First Amendment had to include the 
freedoms protected in 1215.133 So have conservative groups seeking to 
funnel more money into campaign advertising and to revolutionize 
campaign finance law.134 In this way, for some conservative 
movements, Magna Carta lays out the most basic protections 
Americans can expect. 
While serving as a baseline, Magna Carta also helps to reinforce 
the pedigree of the constitutional rights that movement conservatives 
demand. Because Magna Carta referred to opposite-sex marriage 
only, those opposed to marriage equality described access to the 
traditional institution as more constitutionally significant than many 
other liberty interests. As arguments based on religious conscience 
take center stage, Magna Carta more often serves as a catalyst for the 
stance that the oldest, most deeply rooted rights deserve the most 
protection.135 As grassroots conservatives suggest, a right protected by 
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Magna Carta is more significant than many others that were only 
recently recognized by the courts.136 
Magna Carta also works as an alternative to the liberty- and 
equality-based traditions that progressive movements tie to the 
Reconstruction Amendments. In the 1970s, some conservative 
groups, including pro-life organizations, stressed that the framers of 
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments intended to 
both protect disenfranchised minorities and reinvigorate traditional 
constitutional rights.137 In part, a variety of conservative movements 
claimed to fight discrimination and to represent minorities just as 
vulnerable as women or people of color, whether that vulnerable 
group included unborn children or whites susceptible to “reverse 
discrimination.”138 Pro-lifers presented the fetus as the next minority 
in line for protection under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment—similar in salient ways to racial minorities 
or illegitimate children.139 In Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke,140 groups opposed to affirmative action, including the 
anticommunist Young Americans for Freedom, argued not that an 
antisubordination approach to the Fourteenth Amendment was 
illegitimate, but rather that Italians, Jews, and Poles deserved as much 
solicitude as African Americans.141 
Moreover, in the 1970s, when Magna Carta played a less central 
role in conservative constitutional strategy, some right-leaning groups 
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championed judicial recognition of rights that were at most implied in 
the text or history of the Constitution. For the better part of a decade 
after Roe, the United States Catholic Conference argued that the 
courts should use substantive due process to recognize a right to life 
for the unborn child.142 Pro-life lawyer Robert Byrn, an attorney 
known for serving as a guardian ad litem for all fetuses scheduled for 
abortion at New York hospitals, wrote that the pro-life movement 
had no reason to take a clear stand in debates about the courts’ 
activism in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment.143 
By the 1980s, when the Republican Party and grassroots 
conservatives made condemnations of judicial activism a central part 
of their message, activists in groups like the pro-life movement sought 
out a new symbol of their commitments. Magna Carta resonated with 
pro-lifers and their allies partly because it fit well within the new 
politics of originalism—a reminder of the value of history and 
tradition in interpreting constitutional rights.144 In 1982, Solicitor 
General Rex Lee articulated the administration’s argument against 
the invention of new rights under the Fourteenth Amendment:145 “If 
an unmentioned constitutional right can be pieced together by the 
judiciary out of bits and scraps that bear some resemblance to a 
variety of other provisions in the Constitution,” Lee reasoned, “then 
there is little limit to the extent to which judges can substitute their 
own judgment for that of the legislature.”146 Because Magna Carta 
predated the Constitution, activists could easily use it in defending 
history and tradition as constraints on the judiciary. 
As importantly, Magna Carta worked perfectly as a symbol of 
the dangers of big government. While some arguments based on the 
Fourteenth Amendment presented the government, and particularly 
the courts, as the protectors of those sometimes victimized by popular 
majorities, Magna Carta worked well in a narrative that described 
government as the victimizer. 
In dialogue about constitutional interpretation, critics of 
Reagan’s new push for a jurisprudence of original intent argued that 
Reagan had attacked the independence of the judiciary and thereby 
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put individual liberty at risk.147 “An independent judiciary is 
indispensable to the maintenance of individual rights,” The Nation 
argued in 1985.148 “One of the first targets, therefore, for those who 
would destroy or weaken liberty is the judges.”149 Magna Carta helped 
conservatives argue that the judiciary posed a threat to individual 
liberty. Reagan promised to nominate judges “who understand the 
danger of short-circuiting the electoral process and disenfranchising 
the people through judicial activism.”150 Much as King John had 
gutted the traditional liberties of the people through abusing his 
power, as conservative activists argued, liberal courts practiced a 
modern form of tyranny. 
Magna Carta has become an even more logical tool for 
conservative movements spotlighting religious liberty. In the 1970s, 
social conservatives sometimes steered clear of the idea of religious 
liberty.151 Feminists often argued that pro-lifers simply sought to 
impose their religious views on everyone else,152 and pro-choice 
attorneys argued that antiabortion laws thinly veiled an expressly 
religious, Catholic cause in a way that contravened the Establishment 
Clause.153 The antiabortion movement had little reason to use 
religious arguments at a time when activists constantly fended off 
accusations of sectarian bigotry. 
By contrast, in the lead-up to the Hobby Lobby litigation, 
arguments about religious liberty became shorthand for opposition to 
the contraceptive mandate.154 Activists argued that Magna Carta had 
recognized the importance of religious liberty, even for 
corporations.155 After the Hobby Lobby decision, conscience-based 
objections—some of them tied to Magna Carta—play a central role in 
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the fight over same-sex marriage, abortion, and public 
accommodations for gays and lesbians.156 
Magna Carta often figures centrally in a conservative message 
anchored by concern about religious liberty and tradition. It forms 
part of a narrative about how religion—and often Christianity—
served as a cornerstone in the creation of America and the liberties it 
holds dear. The Baptist Press, a publication of the Southern Baptist 
Conference, points to Magna Carta as proof that at a time of 
“escalating religious liberty issues,” “the struggle for religious liberty 
has been in progress for 800 years.”157 Robert Knight’s attack on 
Obergefell reiterated that Magna Carta was a Christian document 
largely inspired by Archbishop Stephen Langston.158 “The Magna 
Carta is the grandfather to America’s Constitution and every other 
government-limiting compact,” Knight argued, “and it’s based on 
Christian-informed medieval concepts.”159 
Within the Court, as Din suggests, Magna Carta also stands at 
the center of the debate about the legitimacy of implied fundamental 
rights and the boundaries of the Due Process Clause. Justice Breyer’s 
dissenting opinion positions the charter as compatible with 
procedural due process requirements that protect citizens’ implied 
right to marriage.160 By contrast, Scalia’s majority draws on 
conservative movement efforts to frame the charter as evidence of the 
limited rights protected by the Constitution.161 In Scalia’s view, any 
implied fundamental right, whether involving abortion, contraception, 
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or same-sex marriage, has nothing to do with either Magna Carta or 
the Due Process Clause.162 
B. The Accuracy and Effectiveness of Conservative Reliance on 
Magna Carta 
How effective or accurate are conservative claims about Magna 
Carta? Activists describe Magna Carta as a symbol of resistance to 
arbitrary governmental authority and a source for rights that still 
define American constitutional tradition, including religious liberty.163 
Yet conservatives’ idea of Magna Carta does not directly draw on the 
text or the history of the charter so much as it does “Lord Coke’s 
metamorphosing Magna Carta from a medieval adjustment of feudal 
power into a constitutional document restraining arbitrary power.”164 
Conservative arguments focus on the symbolism and mythology of 
Magna Carta rather than its actual language, but this is nothing new. 
Civil libertarians and civil rights activists working in the 1960s 
sometimes ignored the historical context and precise language of the 
charter, using symbolism instead to establish the pedigree of 
procedural protections for criminal defendants.165 
Moreover, neither conservative nor progressive descriptions of 
Magna Carta are completely disconnected from the charter’s history. 
Progressive movement organizations have picked up on constitutional 
rights, like due process, that bear some resemblance to those set out 
in the charter.166 Conservative efforts to tie the charter to religious 
freedom have some truth to them as well. The charter did grant 
freedoms, rights, and liberties to the English Church, and the barons 
were steeped in the Christian thinking of their day, as was Stephen 
Langston, the Archbishop of Canterbury, who played an important 
part in the crafting of the charter.167 Rarely, however, do activists, 
state constitutions, or the federal Constitution rely on the text of the 
charter.168 Actors across the political spectrum mostly look to the 
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mythology that has grown up around Magna Carta rather than the 
charter itself.169 
If conservative arguments about Magna Carta are no more or 
less accurate than many others, have right-wing activists identified a 
particularly effective use of the charter? It is hard to find conclusive 
evidence to answer this question, but this Section offers some 
preliminary suggestions. On the one hand, Magna Carta likely works 
well as a rhetorical tool because of the widespread popularity of the 
general ethos of originalism.170 Jamal Greene, Nathan Persily, and 
Stephen Ansolabehere offer evidence that a majority of Americans 
believe that “judges ought to factor original intent into their 
interpretations of the Constitution” and that those who most highly 
value originalism “share the characteristics traditionally associated 
with political conservatives.”171 Because Magna Carta often appears 
in legal appeals to history and tradition, conservative arguments 
about the charter may tap into widespread conviction about the 
relevance of original intent. Given the value of originalism in 
mobilizing movement conservatives,172 arguments based on Magna 
Carta may also work especially well in rallying the members of 
different right-wing movements. 
On the other hand, because of the fluidity of Magna Carta as a 
symbol, progressive movements will sometimes benefit just as much 
from invoking the charter. In this way, the fluidity of Magna Carta 
tracks the mutability of originalism.173 Notwithstanding a rich 
scholarly debate about the flaws of some forms of originalism174 and 
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the coexistence of several brands of originalism,175 members of the 
Supreme Court who disagree on the merits of key constitutional 
methods invoke originalist methods. In District of Columbia v. 
Heller,176 both the principal majority177 and dissent pointed to original 
intent in support of their arguments.178 In Obergefell v. Hodges, 
Justice Kennedy’s majority179 and several of the dissenting opinions 
drew on the original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment.180 Magna 
Carta’s meaning has been equally manipulable. Thus as long as the 
charter serves as a particularly effective symbol in American law and 
politics, activists with deeply different views may be able to exploit its 
power. 
CONCLUSION 
Conservatives’ fondness for Magna Carta showcases its power in 
contemporary American constitutionalism. For a variety of 
conservative groups, Magna Carta reminds us of the importance of 
history and tradition, the danger of government tyranny, and the 
importance of religious faith as a guarantor of other liberties. Now, as 
was the case in a recent New York Times editorial, liberals can 
respond that the nation should stop revering Magna Carta and 
“stretch[ing] old legal texts beyond their original meaning.”181 
Alternatively, all movements would be well served to remember how 
often the popular meaning of Magna Carta has changed. Indeed, in 
2015, Justices Scalia and Breyer both invoked the charter in setting 
 
Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control Over Social Issues, 85 
IOWA L. REV. 1, 6, 101–02 (1999) (describing the failure of originalists to adhere to the 
original meaning of “commerce”); Peter J. Smith,	 Sources of Federalism: An Empirical 
Analysis of the Court’s Quest for Original Meaning, 52 UCLA L. REV. 217, 286–87 (2004) 
(describing the “vast body of primary historical materials	.	.	.	that support a spectrum of 
constitutional meaning” and the resulting failure of originalist methodology to restrain 
judicial interpretation). 
 175. Post & Siegel, supra note 172, at 225–28 (describing different approaches to 
originalism). 
 176. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 177. Id. at 579–83. 
 178. Id. at 652–66 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 179. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (“The generations that wrote 
and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know 
the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future generations a 
charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning.”). 
 180. Id. at 2614 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“There is no dispute that every State at the 
founding—and every State throughout our history until a dozen years ago—defined 
marriage in the traditional, biologically rooted way.”); id. at 2632 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 181. Tom Ginsburg, Stop Revering Magna Carta, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/15/opinion/stop-revering-magna-carta.html?_r=0 
[perma.cc/XY9M-TZNP (dark archive)]. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1653 (2016) 
1680 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
out deeply different understandings of the Due Process Clause and 
the legitimacy of implied fundamental rights.182 
The mutability of Magna Carta helps to explain its rich and 
varied uses. As Jill Lepore has noted, the charter arguably seems 
more popular and resonant in the United States than in the United 
Kingdom.183 For activists, attorneys, and politicians across the political 
spectrum, Magna Carta has long been a flashpoint in fights about the 
meaning of liberty and tyranny. As long as any movement questions 
the role of the government in daily life, Magna Carta will still have a 
hold on us. 
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